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The emerging literature on the ―quality of democracy‖ promises to advance our 
knowledge of democratization in several ways. First of all, it takes us beyond 
the narrow assessment of stability and endurance of democratic political regimes 
to ask about the quality of democracy those regimes supply.  We move from 
asking ―how stable?‖ to ―how well?‖ Second, the concept of quality promises to 
provide us with greater nuance and precision, and thus greater ability to 
distinguish amongst widely disparate countries -- such as Cape Verde and 
Ghana on one hand, and Canada and Greece on the other -- that are usually 
lumped together as free, or as liberal democracies by the relatively blunt 
measures provided by Freedom House or Polity.  Finally, and related to this, it 
enables us to move beyond ―whole system‖ (Diamond 2002) measures and 
brings into focus differing dimensions of democracy, allowing us to appreciate 
that some countries can do better on some dimensions but worse on others.  This 
also opens up the possibility that we may be able to measure democratic 
qualities in countries that do not qualify as electoral or liberal democracies 
(Elkins 2000). 
 
The emerging ―quality of democracy‖ framework also invites analysts to go 
beyond behavioural measures or expert judgments of objective phenomena and 
include the lived experiences and subjective evaluations of ordinary citizens.  
While various conceptual frameworks of democratic quality have been proposed 
(e.g. Beetham et al, 2001; Merkel 2004; Croissant 2004; Merkel and Croissant 
2004), in our view, the framework that combines the greatest degree of 
conceptual development with realistic cross-national data collection and 
measurement has been proposed by Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino 
(2005). Drawing on definitions provided by the industrial and marketing 
literatures, Diamond and Morlino find three different understandings of quality.  
The quality of a good or service can be measured by (1) the process by which it 
is made or delivered; (2) by its content – or the structural characteristics of the 
material by which it is made; and (3) by its results, or the satisfaction of its 
consumers (regardless of how it is produced, or its actual content).  Using this 
logic, they divide a range of key dimensions of democracy into these three 
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clusters.  First, the quality of democracy can be assessed through a series of 
procedures: Rule of Law, Participation, Competition, and Vertical and 
Horizontal Accountability.  Second, democracies can be measured by the degree 
to which they provide the substantive content of democracy: Rights and 
Freedoms, and Equality.  Finally, the quality of democracy can be calculated 
according to the extent that a system is able to provide the essential result, that 
is, a government that does what the people want it to do – or Responsiveness.  It 
is on this last dimension that Diamond and Morlino advocate the use of 
individual level survey data aggregated to the country level to measure public 
demands in order to assess the extent to which public policy reflects those 
demands (but see Powell (2005) for a discussion of the range of difficulties 
raised by this strategy) or the extent to which citizens are satisfied with the 
outputs of democratic government. 
 
However, we wonder whether citizens‘ lived experiences and opinions can be 
successfully limited to a measure of only the results dimension of democratic 
quality.  To return to the analogy of the industrial and marketing world, it does 
not make sense for a study of the quality of an automobile to ask consumers 
about the workings of the Volkswagen Annual General Meeting, the efficiency 
of Toyota‘s assembly line or the metal alloy used by General Motors in its 
assembly plants.  But the same is not true for citizens in a democracy.  The use 
of data on citizen opinions experiences and evaluations may enable us to capture 
more valid ―insider‖ or ―ground-up‖ measures of democratic procedures and 
substance that reflect actual behaviours and conditions which are simply missed 
by ―outsider‖ expert judges and ―top-down‖ macro level indicators.  Indeed, 
public opinion researchers routinely ask citizens about their experiences and 
evaluations of a wide range of aspects of both procedure and substance.  Citizen 
experiences and evaluations are essential pieces of data which tell us, for 
example, whether the day-to-day reality of how governments interact with their 
citizens matches the standards set out ―on paper.‖ Does the presence, for 
example, of a public ombudsman in Ghana, really mean that an ordinary 
Ghanaian can safely and successfully find a means to redress inequalities, right 
wrongs, or get something done in her community? Does the existence of a 
watchdog anti-corruption commission actually reduce the likelihood that an 
average Ugandan will encounter demands for bribes or face discrimination in 
seeing her case through the courts?  And does the existence of a wide range of 
constitutionally entrenched social democratic rights and a state of the art 
constitution guarantee that South Africans will conclude that their political 
system produces an acceptable degree of democracy?  To paraphrase John Stuart 
Mill, citizens know where the democratic shoe pinches. 
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But if it is difficult to limit the use of survey data to the results dimension, it 
may be even more difficult to officiate between the conclusions drawn from 
expert judgments and objective data on one hand, and survey data on the other, 
should those data contradict one another.  If we justify the use of subjective 
attitudinal data on the ground that it might produce more valid measures of 
democratic reality, it does not require much of a stretch to extend the logic and 
argue that such perceptions are the reality.  To return to Mill, if citizens say ―the 
shoe pinches,‖ the shoe pinches – regardless of what objective data or expert 
ratings of the shoe might declare.  From this perspective, democratic quality is 
only knowable from the ―eye of the beholder.‖  To be clear, we do not want to 
be pushed to this extreme.  We hold that objective data and expert evaluations 
need to play a central role in the measurement of democratic quality.  Our 
purpose here is only to warn that once we bring attitudinal data into this 
framework, we must consider our analytical response if popular evaluations 
depart from other assessments in important ways.   
 
In this paper we try to deploy and test the limits of public opinion data in the 
measurement of democratic quality. We seek to develop indicators based on 
public attitude data for the full array of quality dimensions developed by 
Diamond and Morlino (2005).  Previous research has shown that Africans are 
able to offer separate and analytically distinct expressions of their demand for 
democracy and their assessments of its overall supply (Bratton, Mattes and 
Gyimah-Boadi 2005).  But pushing further on the ―supply side,‖ we ask whether 
Africans are able to go beyond global, ―whole system‖ assessments of the 
supply of democracy and provide meaningful, distinct evaluations of various 
dimensions of democratic governance? To put it another way, we wonder 
whether political scientists make distinctions that are ―too fine‖ and not evident 
to ordinary citizens. To the extent that citizens do offer a nuanced assessment of 
democracy, we ask whether the structure of these attitudes resembles the quality 
of democracy framework. Do responses to questions designed to measure a 
given dimension cohere together? And are they distinct from responses to 
questions intended to measure other dimensions?  Or do people view democracy 
through a different lens entirely? Finally, if we find that Africans‘ views of 
democracy are indeed organized along some schema that resembles the quality 
of democracy framework, we ask what picture of democracy emerges from the 
data. Where do citizens perceive lesser or greater quality in democratic 
governance? And how do Africans‘ own ratings compare to those of the political 
scientists and country experts who produce other well-known indicators?  In 
fact, previous research has found that Africans‘ estimates of the overall extent of 
democracy in their country correlate quite strongly with expert ratings such as 
Freedom House (Bratton 2007).  But will we find the same thing with regard to 
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popular assessments of democratic qualities?  Finally, we explore the impact of 
the various dimensions of democratic quality on citizens overall evaluations of 
the supply of democracy. Do people base their global judgements more on 
procedures, substance or results? 
 
 
Operationalizing the quality of democracy 
framework with public opinion data 
 
Our analysis of these issues is based on the results of over 27,000 face-to-face 
interviews of nationally representative clustered, stratified area probability 
samples conducted by Afrobarometer in 20 countries in 2008-2009.
1
  Sample 
sizes ranged from approximately 1200 to 2400 respondents per country, 
although in the statistics reported here, the data are weighted to represent each 
country equally (n=1200). The margin of sampling error never exceeds 3 percent 
at a 95 percent level of confidence. We caution the reader that because 
Afrobarometer surveys are concentrated in countries that have undergone at 
least some degree of political and economic liberalization in the last decade 
(although there are exceptions), these results generally represent the continent‘s 
most open societies and cannot be taken as representative of sub-Saharan Africa 
as a whole.
2
 It should also be noted that while assessing attitudes toward and 
evaluations of democracy and governance is a core purpose of the 
Afrobarometer, the survey instrument was not explicitly designed with the intent 
of measuring the quality of democracy.  Nonetheless, the scope and variety of 
questions included suggests the possibility of developing a comprehensive set of 
quality indicators. 
 
We began by identifying all questions items that on face validity could 
potentially measure each of Diamond and Morlino‘s dimensions. We then tested 
the integrity of each scale or construct using factor analysis (to examine validity) 
and reliability analysis to eliminate items whose pattern of responses did not 
cohere with the rest of the items in the proposed scale. In all instances, the 
remaining items were then re-tested and the scale scores are reported in the 
endnotes.
3
 As it turns out, we successfully developed valid and reliable multi-
                                                          
1
 Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
2
  For more information on the Afrobarometer, visit the website at www.afrobarometer.org. 
3
 There are many different combinations of methods of Factor Analyses.  We error on the side 
of caution, and use the most stringent methods: Maximum Likelihood methods of extraction 
and Direct Oblimin methods of rotation, guaranteeing that if a factor solution can be found 
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item constructs or scales for six of the eight dimensions, but the indicators for 
Horizontal Accountability and Equality presented greater challenges to be 
discussed below. The specific Afrobarometer survey question items that were 
used to create indicators for each of the eight dimensions of quality of 
democracy are shown in Table 1. Some brief notes on each indicator are 
provided below. 
 
Table 1: Component Indicators for the Dimensions of Quality of Democracy 
Dimension Question Item Indicators 
Rule of law How much do you trust each of the following:  
-the police? 
-the courts of law? 
How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption:  
-police? 
-judges and magistrates? 
In the past year, how often (if ever) have you had to pay a bribe, give a gift, or 
do a favour to government officials in order to: 
-get a document or permit? 
-avoid a problem with the police? 
-How often do officials who commit crimes go unpunished? 
Participation -With regard to the most recent, [200x] national elections, which statement is 
true for you? (responses: voted in the election vs. did not vote or were not 
registered) 
Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens.  For each of 
these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things 
during the past year: 
-attended a community meeting? 
-got together with others to raise an issue? 
-attended a demonstration or protest march? 
During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following 
persons about some important problem or to give them your views: 
-a local government councillor? 
-a Member of Parliament? 
-an official of a government agency? 
Competition -On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last 
national election? 
-How much do you trust the National Electoral Commission of [your 
country]? 
-During election campaigns in this country, how much do you personally fear 
becoming a victim of political intimidation or violence? 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
with these methods, it will be found with all other methods. Test statistics from Factor 
Analysis and Reliability Analysis are cited in order to establish the validity and reliability of 
all multiple item indices.  However, we ultimately calculate and use simple average, and in 
some specified cases—additive, index scores in bivariate and multivariate analysis.  Since the 
actual factor weightings of individual items may vary greatly across countries and language 
groups, it is much safer to assume that all items contribute to each index equally. 
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-How likely do you think it is that powerful people can find out how you 
voted, even though there is supposed to be a secret ballot in this country? 




Think about how elections work in practice in this country.  How well do 
elections: 
-ensure that Members of Parliament reflect the views of voters? 




-How often does the President ignore the laws of this country? 
Freedom In this country, how free are you: 
-to say what you think? 
-to join any political organization you want? 
-to choose who to vote for without feeling pressured? 
-In this county, how often do people have to be careful of what they say about 
politics? 
Equality -How often are people treated unequally under the law? 
Responsiveness How likely is it that you could get together with others and make your _____ 
listen to your concerns about a matter of importance to the community? 
-elected local councillor? 
-member of parliament  
How much of the time do you think the following try their best to listen to 
what people like you have to say? 
-MPs 
-Elected local government councillors. 
-When there are problems with how local government is run in your 
community, how much can an ordinary person do to improve the situation? 




Rule of law 
 
Diamond and Morlino propose a ―thick notion‖ of rule of law that includes, 
among other things, equal and unfettered access to, and protection by, the legal 
system, equal enforcement of the law, a neutral and independent judiciary and a 
professional police force, minimal corruption, and a constitution and justice 
system that have earned the respect and adherence of both the security agencies 
and the public at large (thus suggesting that public attitude data is a highly 
relevant to measuring success in achieving the rule of law). They then go on to 
add that rule of law is distinguished by a legal system that ―defends the 
democratic procedures, upholds citizens‘ civil and political rights, and reinforces 
the authority of other agencies of horizontal accountability‖ (2005: xv). 
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This broad and multi-faceted description presents challenges to developing a 
single indicator that captures all of the dimensions of rule of law that Diamond 
and Morlino have described.  This task is further complicated by that fact that 
there are numerous points of overlap with other dimensions, including 
horizontal accountability, freedom, and especially equality. Diamond and 
Morlino‘s framework might benefit, therefore, from a revised definition of the 
rule of law that is either considerably more parsimonious, or that is 
disaggregated into several clear sub-components. The dimension might, for 
example, be better understood as a collection of several distinct sub-dimensions 
that include beliefs about the law, the trustworthiness of political and state 
institutions and their incumbents, levels of, and actual experiences with 
corruption and crime and access to and the equality of law enforcement and 
justice. 
 
The Afrobarometer includes a wide array of indicators that tap these various 
dimensions of the rule of law.  We were able to create a single Index of the Rule 
of Law that consists of beliefs about trustworthiness and levels of corruption in 
key law enforcement agencies (the police and courts), and the degree to which 
people are victimized by those institutions, as well as popular perceptions of the 
extent to which government officials are subject to the law.
4
  It is important to 
note that beliefs about the right of the police, the courts, and tax collection 
agencies to require compliance did not fit in this index. Neither did personal 





Diamond and Morlino‘s dimension of participation is intended to measure the 
public‘s formal and effective ability to engage in politics in a host of ways, 
including voting, joining organizations and associations, communicating with 
others, contacting officials, and, in sum, seeking to influence the policy-making 
process.  Afrobarometer provides numerous indicators of respondents‘ reported 
levels of participation, including voting, contacting leaders, and various forms of 
communal engagement. Table 1 identifies seven items that scale together to 
form a single Index of Participation.
5
 
                                                          
4
  Factor analysis extracted two rotated factors with Eigenvalues over 1 from these seven 
items. We use the first and strongest of the two factors, with an Eigenvalue of 2.21 and which 
explains 32 percent of the common variance. Reliability is acceptable (Cronbach‘s 
alpha=0.625). 
5
  Factor analysis extracted two rotated factors with Eigenvalues over 1 from these six items.  
We use the first and strongest of the two factors, with an Eigenvalue of 2.42 and which 
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It should be noted that all these indicators of participation measure people‘s 
actual decisions to take action, not the freedom or opportunity that the regime 
offers for them to act.  This index thus raises a fundamental question about the 
scope of the quality of democracy framework.  In particular, we find Diamond 
and Morlino‘s framework to be somewhat ambiguous on the question of 
whether quality is something provided by political regimes, or if it is something 
that emerges out of the interaction between the opportunities provided by a 
regime, and whether or not citizens take advantage of those opportunities 
through action, thus leading to the actual achievement of a democratic goal.  At 
one point Diamond and Morlino note that ―a quality democracy [is] one that 
provides its citizens a high degree of freedom, political equality, and popular 
control…‖ (xi, emphasis added). Similarly, with respect to vertical 
accountability they refer to the government‘s obligation to provide ―the freedom 
for these groups to function and a rule of law that protects them from 
intimidation and retribution‖ (xx).  But elsewhere, they appear to conceive of 
quality as requiring the actual achievement of vertical accountability through 
citizen action.   
 
For now, we note that the use of self-reported behaviour as an indicator of 
quality rests on the assumption that levels of citizen action reflect the 
opportunity structure provided by political institutions.  Yet we know that that 
participation is based on a wide range of factors beyond the actual opportunity 
for influence (Dalton 2008). Thus, it is quite possible to imagine situations 
where apathetic citizens fail to take advantage of the opportunities provide to 
them by the system, or conversely, where critical citizens participate even when 
it is otherwise not rational do so. Hence, we propose that the quality of 
democracy framework should ultimately separate the provision of opportunities 
for citizen action from the question of whether or not citizens actually take 





Regular, free and fair elections that involve competition between different 
political parties are widely seen as a minimal indicator of democracy.  But as 
defined by Diamond and Morlino, the concept of competition as an indicator of 
quality must go further, incorporating the ease of entry into political competition 
for new political actors, the equality of access to the media and to campaign 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
explains 40 percent of the common variance.  Reliability is acceptable (Cronbach‘s 
alpha=0.680). 
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funding, and, ultimately, the ease with which incumbents can actually be 
defeated. They suggest that in a high-quality democracy, there must be a real 
likelihood of alternation.  But while the attempt to gangue the likelihood of party 
alternations almost always leads analysts to make use of election results (e.g. the 
margin of victory, the distance between the first and second party, or the number 
of effective parties), we argue that this conflates the rules and conditions that 
allow for the possibility of competitiveness (or what Dahl in Polyarchy called 
contestation) with how competitive the process actually is. To use another 
analogy, one soccer game can end in a 10-0 whitewash despite being played on 
an immaculate pitch and officiated by a scrupulously fair referee, while another 
can end in a 1-1 draw even though one team was smaller, had less training, and 
had to overcome the bias of the referee.
6
  In other words, the fairness or level of 
contestation in an election, and the competitiveness, or closeness of the 
outcome, are two different – though often interrelated – things.  We note, for 
example, the enduring historical legacy that continues to privilege the African 
National Congress (ANC) over other parties in South Africa even in a context of 
high levels of political and civil freedoms and elections widely regarded as free 
and fair.  The country enjoys high levels of contestation, but at least at the 
national level, electoral contests are far from competitive.  Thus, the indicators 
that we have included in our Index of Competition, as shown in Table 1, 
privilege public evaluations of the fairness or contestation of the process over 
the closeness of electoral outcomes.  We find that five varied indicators of the 
freeness and fairness of elections, trust in the electoral commission and citizens 








The obligation of elected leaders to answer to citizens and non-governmental 
actors for their decisions and actions is referred to as vertical accountability.  
Vertical accountability is enforced most directly via elections, but it can and 
should also occur between elections through a system of media monitoring, civil 
society engagement, and individual action, known as societal accountability (see 
Smulovitz and Peruzotti 2000).  Questions have been raised about the extent to 
which African publics expect or demand a relationship of inter-electoral vertical 
                                                          
6
  We are indebted to Elliot Mitchell who develops this point in Political Competition and 
Elections Results in Africa: A Conceptual Critique With Data (Masters Thesis: University of 
Cape Town, 2010). 
7
  Factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor with an Eigenvalue of 1.79, explaining 36 
percent of the common variance.  Reliability, however, (Cronbach‘s Alpha=.543), is barely 
acceptable.  . 
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accountability with their governments (Bratton and Logan 2009).  But for our 
purposes here, we build an Index of Vertical Accountability not on demand for 
this quality – which may be weak in many countries – but on its supply: in short, 
perceptions of how well elections serve to represent public opinion and remove 
bad leaders.
8
 It is notable that responses to questions about citizens‘ ability to 
make elected leaders listen do not load onto a single factor with the other items 





Horizontal accountability refers to the extent to which office holders in 
government have to report information, answer to, or justify their decisions to 
other officials within government.  It refers generally to the system of checks 
and balances that exist between judicial, legislative and executive branches of 
government, but also to the ability of monitoring agencies or institutions such as 
anti-corruption commissions, ombudsman‘s offices, opposition parties and 
others to compel cooperation from the government officials they are meant to 
monitor or oversee.  As such, horizontal accountability appears at first blush to 
be best suited to measurement via external, macro-level assessments, rather than 
public attitudes.  But the Afrobarometer does include a question that measures 
one aspect of the supply of horizontal accountability by exploring the extent to 
which people think there are effective checks on presidential power (which, we 
note, overlaps with the rule of law dimension).  We readily concede that a one-
item indicator is generally sub-optimal.  However, given that one overwhelming 
concern in Africa is presidentialism (i.e., systems dominated by excessively 
strong  -- de facto or de jure -- presidents with insufficient limits on their 
powers), the Afrobarometer question that asks respondents how often the 
president respects the law may in fact do quite a good job of capturing overall 





Freedom is perhaps the most straightforward, clearly and concisely defined of 
all of the dimensions of democratic quality.  It refers to the extent to which the 
system protects and respects political rights to engage in electoral activities 
(campaigning, standing for office, organizing, voting), civil rights to speech, 
association, and movement, and socioeconomic rights.  We create a single Index 
                                                          
8
 The two items are sufficiently correlated (Pearson's r = .57) and reliable (Cronbach‘s Alpha 
= .73) to warrant the creation of a two item average Index of Vertical Accountability. 
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of Freedom from four Afrobarometer items that ask respondents about the extent 








In the African context (as elsewhere) equality is a multi-faceted concept.  As 
Diamond and Morlino present it, the core features of this dimension of 
democratic quality include equal rights (overlapping with the freedom 
dimension), equal treatment under the law (overlapping with the rule of law 
dimension), equal influence in voting and policy-making (which overlaps with 
the responsiveness dimension) and freedom from discrimination.  With regard to 
economic equality, Diamond and Morlino also note that while democracy does 
not require a specific set of policies or outcomes, it can nonetheless be 
undermined by extreme social or economic inequalities that undermine political 
engagement and influence.  As such, the concept is diverse enough that it can be 
difficult to approach a single indicator of equality. 
 
The Afrobarometer includes a number of questions about various aspects of the 
experience of or protection of equality and equal treatment.  These items cover 
both economic and political equality, and in some cases approach the question 
from the specific vantage point of ethnic equality. However, none of the 
responses to these questions scale together at a level that allows us to combine 
multiple variables into a single indicator of equality.  This outcome suggests that 
both the importance of equality and the very nature of equality vary too much 
from country to country to develop a single, common, multi-faceted indicator 
that can serve across all of the countries included in our study. 
 
In particular, the conventional wisdom about the widespread salience of ethnic 
concerns on the continent suggests that inequality, if it exists, it is likely to 
coalesce around ethnic divides.  But while such patterns may be evident in some 
countries, they are completely absent in others.  For example, in Cape Verde, 
―ethnic identity‖ is quite low.  Fully 53 percent do not identify with any ethnic 
group, far higher than in any other country in our sample (the next highest are 
Mozambique and South Africa, at 15 and 14 percent, respectively).  And of the 
remainder, only 7 percent believe that their ethnic group is ―often‖ or ―always‖ 
treated unfairly by government.  Yet a full 50 percent of Cape Verdians believe 
that the government ―often‖ or ―always‖ treats people unequally.  Similarly, in 
                                                          
9
 Factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor with an Eigenvalue of 2.20, explaining 79 
percent of the common variance.  Reliability is acceptable (Cronbach‘s alpha=0.652). 
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Lesotho, where a single language dominates and ethnic divisions are rarely seen 
as a relevant issue, nearly as many people (62 percent) think that people are 
regularly treated unequally by government as in Kenya (70 percent), a country 
renowned for its high level of ethnic tension.  Meanwhile, the concerns about 
unequal treatment in Lesotho far surpass those in Botswana – which is also 
relatively linguistically homogenous –where just 19 percent perceive problems 
of unequal treatment, the lowest of any country. Thus, it appears that despite the 
conventional wisdom about the widespread salience of ethnic issues on the 
continent, an ethnic lens is too limiting to fully address the question of equality 
or inequality. We therefore rely instead on a more general indicator of 
(in)equality for the purposes of this analysis: the perceived frequency with 





Diamond and Morlino define responsiveness as the extent to which a 
government responds to the preferences, interests and needs of their citizens.  
This dimension is perhaps the least clearly elucidated of those in the framework.  
Responsiveness can be measured in many different ways: by the extent to which 
governments address the problem areas prioritized by citizens; by the extent to 
which government policy reflects the policy preferences of the public (which 
could either mean a majority, a plurality, or the median voter); or by the extent 
to which voters feel that their elected officials listen to them.  For the purposes 
of this analysis, we opt for the last option, drawing on six indicators of how well 
citizens feel representatives listen to the voices of their constituents to construct 





An overall index of democratic quality 
 
Finally, we find that it is possible to create a single underlying ―second order‖ 
Index of Democratic Quality based on the average responses to the eight 
indicators (six indices and two single item indicators) of the dimensions of 
democratic quality.
11
 This suggests that ordinary African citizens not only 
                                                          
10
 Factor analysis extracted two rotated factors with Eigenvalues over 1 from these seven 
items.  We use the first and strongest of the two factors, with an Eigenvalue of 2.28 and which 
explains 31 percent of the common variance.  Reliability is acceptable (Cronbach‘s 
alpha=0.618). 
11
 Factor analysis extracted two rotated factors with Eigenvalues over 1 from these eight 
measures.  We use the first and strongest of these, which has an Eigenvalues of 2.60 and 
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recognize and distinguish among the various individual dimensions of 
democratic quality, as proposed by Diamond and Morlino, but that these 
dimensions also manage to capture analytically distinct elements of a broader 
underlying dimension of quality.  
 
 






We present in Table 2 a summary of the average (mean) values for each of these 
eight indicators across 20 countries in 2008-2009.  Responses to all items were 
standardized to a scale of 0 (equivalent to a perception that there is no supply of 
a particular quality) to a maximum of 4 (indicating complete supply of that 
dimension).  While the metrics of each are not exactly equivalent and we should 
not make too much of the comparison across indicators, the rank ordering in 
Table 2 does give some indication of the comparative supply of each dimension.  
According to popular perceptions, the most widely enjoyed dimension of 
democratic quality is Freedom (2.9 on the 0 to 4 scale) which scores well above 
the putative midpoint (2.0 on the 0 to 4 scale).  This result is consistent with a 
wide range of findings based on Afrobarometer data from the past 10 years 
indicating that Africans associate the term democracy first and foremost with the 
protection of rights and freedoms (civil liberties). Moreover, they also perceive 
vast improvements in the protection of these rights since the advent of 
multiparty rule (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 2005).  Respondents also 
provide average scores to Horizontal Accountability (2.6), Rule of Law (2.6) 
and Competitiveness (2.5) that place these above the midpoint.   
 
In contrast, Vertical Accountability (2.1), Equality (1.9), Responsiveness (1.6) 
and Participation (1.3) fall at, or well below the scale midpoint.
12
 Vertical 
Accountability and Responsiveness are particularly important since they reflect 
not only how well African governments treat their people, but also how well 
they interact with them. This suggests that one of the main areas in which 
Africa‘s young democracies and multiparty systems are most deficient is in 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
which explains 32 percent of common variance.  Reliability is acceptable (Cronbach‘s 
alpha=0.669). 
12
 We note that although participation clearly falls far below the other indicators, this may 
derive primarily from the fact that this indicator reflects only reported behaviours, whereas 
the others either mix behaviours and evaluations, or use only evaluations. 
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extending the link between citizens and government beyond regular elections 
and formal constitutional protections to the day-to-day realm of policy-making 
and implementation. In other words, African governments of the 21
st
 century 
may treat their citizens far better than in the past (Freedoms), and are making 
some progress toward establishing the broad institutional structures of 
democracy (Competition, Horizontal Accountability, and Rule of Law), but they 
remain weak when it comes to listening and responding to public priorities, 
preferences and complaints (see also Bratton 2008). 
 





Horizontal Accountability 2.6 
Rule of Law 2.6 
Competitiveness 2.5 









We display in Table 3 the average scores for each Quality of Democracy 
indicator across the 20 countries surveyed by Afrobarometer in 2008-2009.  
Here we can observe an important contribution of the Quality of Democracy 
framework. That is, groups of countries that cluster together with similar or 
identical ratings of overall Quality can have vastly different scores across the 
constituent dimensions. For instance, respondents in Mali and Madagascar 
provide both those countries with similar aggregate self-assessments of 
Democratic Quality (roughly 2.2) but starkly different scores across the various 
dimensions. Whereas Malians report the second highest levels of Participation 
across the 20 countries,
13
 they offer one of the lowest ratings for Equality. 
                                                          
13
 We note, however, that according to International IDEA, at just 36% Mali has one of the 
lowest rates of voter turnout (calculated as a share of registered voters) not just in Africa, but 
in the world.  Turnout as a share of estimated voting age population is, however, considerably 
higher –and more comparable with a number of other countries – at 48%. See 
http://www.idea.int/vt/. 
Table 3: Quality of Democracy Indicators, by Country (2008-2009) 
*All indicators are calculated on 0 to 4 scale, with 0 representing the lowest or minimum level, i.e., no participation or no supply of a dimension 














Botswana 3.2 1.3 3.4 2.6 3.6 3.6 3.1 2.0 2.83 
Ghana 2.6 1.3 2.9 2.7 3.2 3.3 2.5 1.9 2.57 
Malawi 2.9 1.3 2.8 2.8 2.9 3.4 2.3 1.5 2.48 
Tanzania 2.7 1.5 2.8 2.1 3.3 3.2 2.1 1.8 2.48 
Namibia 3.0 1.1 2.6 2.0 3.0 3.1 2.5 1.5 2.34 
Benin 2.5 1.4 2.9 1.9 3.0 3.1 2.1 1.5 2.30 
Mozambique 2.8 1.2 2.8 2.3 2.6 2.6 2.0 2.0 2.29 
Cape Verde 2.7 1.1 2.7 2.3 2.6 2.9 1.9 1.7 2.21 
Madagascar 2.6 1.2 2.7 2.0 2.5 2.6 2.3 1.7 2.21 
Burkina Faso 2.8 1.4 2.7 1.9 2.5 2.6 1.7 2.0 2.21 
Liberia 2.4 1.4 2.3 1.8 2.9 2.9 2.2 1.5 2.17 
Mali 2.4 1.5 2.6 2.1 2.7 2.9 1.4 1.7 2.16 
South Africa 2.6 1.1 2.4 2.1 2.4 2.9 1.9 1.6 2.14 
Lesotho 2.8 1.4 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.9 1.5 1.7 2.09 
Zambia 2.6 1.2 2.3 1.8 2.2 2.9 1.9 1.4 2.03 
Senegal 2.8 1.4 2.5 1.5 1.7 3.1 1.4 1.2 1.95 
Uganda 2.3 1.3 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.8 1.6 1.7 1.94 
Kenya 2.2 1.4 1.6 2.0 2.3 3.0 1.4 1.5 1.90 
Zimbabwe 2.4 1.3 1.6 1.8 1.5 1.9 1.4 1.7 1.69 
Nigeria 2.1 1.0 1.6 1.4 1.9 2.3 1.5 1.3 1.66 
Average 2.6 1.3 2.4 2.0 2.5 2.9 1.9 1.6 2.2 
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Malagasy do exactly the opposite, rating their political system highly on 
Equality, but reporting quite low levels of Participation.  Liberians, meanwhile 
(with a similar aggregate score of 2.17) also rate their government much higher 
than Malians on Equality, but much lower when it comes to the degree of 
Vertical Accountability enjoyed in the country. Similar distinctions among 
countries with comparable aggregate scores are evident at the lowest and highest 
end of the scale as well. At the same time, Botswana give their country the 
highest average rating (2.8) and also rate their system at or very near the top on 
seven of the eight dimensions (the except being Participation), the only country 
that comes close to doing this.  In sharp contrast, Nigerians are harsh and 





position across the eight dimensions.  
 
 
Quality versus supply 
 
As mentioned, the Afrobaroemter survey instrument has not been explicitly 
designed to comprehensively measure all dimensions of the Quality of 
Democracy framework, although some elements of the framework have been 
incorporated into the questionnaire in the series of surveys conducted in 2005-
2006, and again in 2008-2009.  However, the Afrobarometer has developed a 
potentially similar, but much broader global indicator of the perceived Supply of 
Democracy that dates back to the first surveys conducted in 1999.  The Supply 
of Democracy index is derived from responses to two separate indicators.  First, 
Afrobarometer asks respondents ―In your opinion, how much of a democracy is 
[your country] today?‖  Response categories range on a four-point scale from ―a 
full democracy,‖ though ―a democracy with minor problems‖ and ―a democracy 
with major problems,‖ to ―not a democracy.‖  We then ask ―How satisfied are 
you with the way democracy works in [your country]?‖  Those respondents who 
both rate their country as either a full democracy or one with only minor 
problems, and who are either fairly or very satisfied with the way democracy 
works, are considered to be supplied with democracy.  These two responses can 
then be combined into a single reliable Index of the Supply of Democracy.  The 
aggregated average scores have tended to correlate relatively strongly with 
Freedom House scores (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 2005; Mattes and 
Bratton 2007; Bratton and Mattes 2009). 
 
But to what extent do Africans‘ experiences with and evaluations of the discrete 
areas of representative government covered by the Quality of Democracy 
dimensions help them decide how democratic they judge their political system 
to be?  Are the two sets of measures essentially duplicative?  Is measuring the 
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Quality of Democracy merely a fancier and more arduous means of measuring 
the same thing that the Supply of Democracy indicator has always captured?  Or 
do more disaggregated measures of quality tell us something more, or something 
altogether different?   
 
In fact, we find a strong convergence between the two summary indicators.  
Across 20 countries, the aggregate country-mean scores for the Index of 
Democratic Quality correlate very highly with the country-mean value of the 
Index of Supply of Democracy (Pearson‘s r=.897**).  The correlation is also 
quite strong at the individual level (Pearson‘s r=.479**).  But the Quality of 
Democracy framework adds even more value when we assess the micro-level 
relationships among the individual components of democratic quality and 
overall perception of democratic supply. We find that there are meaningful 
connections between seven of the eight dimensions of democratic quality and 
global assessments of the Supply of Democracy (only Participation registers a 
substantively weak bivariate correlation).   
 
Regressing perceptions of the overall Supply of Democracy on the evaluations 
of the eight distinct indices of democratic quality, we find that citizen‘s 
perceptions of electoral contestation (Competition, Beta, the standardized 
regression coefficient=.253) and to a lesser extent the ability to hold presidents 
to account (Horizontal Accountability, Beta=.135) and Freedom (Beta=.123) are 
the most important determinants of their global assessment of the Supply of 
Democracy.  Recall (Table 2) that all three of these (along with Rule of Law) are 
among the dimensions on which respondents think they are getting the greatest 
supply.  In contrast, two of the factors that were seen to be less supplied – 
Responsiveness and Vertical Accountability – also play considerably smaller 
roles in shaping overall assessments of the Supply of Democracy.  This suggests 
not only that governments place a lower priority on supplying responsiveness 
and accountability to citizens, but also that citizens place a lower priority on 
securing these dimensions from their democratic systems.  At the same time, 
while evaluations of the various dimensions of democratic quality make a strong 
contribution to overall judgements of the supply of democracy (adjusted R
2
 = 
.262), the relationship is far from perfect.  While developing a full model of the 
supply of democracy is beyond the scope of this paper, previous research tells us 
that Africans also look to the individual job performance and trustworthiness of 
their president as well as to recent economic trends to adjudge the overall supply 
of democracy (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 2005; Mattes and Bratton 
2007).  At the same time, it is clear that Africans do not ignore these democratic 
qualities, and in fact place great weight on them. 
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Table 4: Micro-Linkages Between Quality of Democracy and Index of 
Supply 
Dependant Variable: Index of Democratic Supply 
Ordinary Least Squares 
 
 
Comparing democracy indicators  
 
How do these ―insider‖ measures  of democracy from the ground up compare 
with ―outsider‖ or  expert assessments made from the top down.  Are insiders 
and outsiders all seeing the same thing?  To assess this, we compare Africans‘ 
evaluations of their country‘s Quality of Democracy and those generated by 
three different expert-based projects: Freedom House‘s Status of Freedom (for 
2008 and 2009);
14
 Polity‘s Democracy Scores (for 2008);
15
 and lastly, the 
Democracy Status Scores produced by the Bertelsmann Transformation Index 
(for 2008 and 2010).
16
 According to citizen perceptions, Botswana (2.83) has the 
highest quality democracy, by a considerable margin followed by Ghana (2.57) 
and  perhaps surprisingly  Malawi (2.48) and Tanzania (2.48). The lowest scores 
belong to a set of countries clustered around 1.9 (Senegal 1.95, Uganda 1.94, 
                                                          
14
 www.freedomhouse.org. Freedom House scores, which range from a ―high‖ of 1 to a ―low‖ 
of 7 on each of two indicators (one for political rights and the other for civil liberties), have 
















(Overall Index)    
Democratic Quality .479** .479***  
    
(Constituent Dimensions)    
Competition .438**  .253*** 
Horizontal 
Accountability 
.334**  .135*** 
Rule of Law .302**  .071*** 
Freedom .297**  .123*** 
Vertical Accountability .241**  .080*** 
Equality .237**  .036*** 
Responsiveness .210**  .093*** 
Participation .077** -  
Adjusted R
2
  .229 .262 
 19 
Kenya 1.9) with Zimbabwe (1.69) and Nigeria (1.66) bringing up the rear (see 
Table 5). 
 
Popular evaluations of Quality of Democracy are most weakly related to the 
scores produced by Polity (r=.322; p=.172).
17
 This poor overall match may 
reflect the fact that the Polity coding scheme focuses on more formal 
institutional features, such as the presence or absence of institutionalized 
procedures for participation and influence, legal restraints on the executive, and 
guarantees of civil liberties (Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers 2009: 13-14).  As such, 
Polity ratings likely miss many of the behavioural violations experienced by 
ordinary citizens (see Table 6).  As a result, a range of countries that are all 
scored by Polity as largely democratic receive vastly different scores from their 
citizens.  For instance Botswana, Ghana, Lesotho and Senegal are all scored by 
Polity at ―+8‖ in 2008 (on a scale from –10 to +10), yet received vastly different 
Quality of Democracy scores from their citizens, ranging from 2.83 (Botswana) 
to 1.95 (Senegal) (on a 0 to 4 scale) (see Figure 1).  Thus, while the assessments 
of Botswana are relatively consistent with those of Polity experts, the 
perspective of the average Senegalese is noticeably at odds with expert opinion. 
  
                                                          
17
 This correlation is calculated across 19 states since Polity does not produce scores for Cape 
Verde. 
Table 5: Quality Indicators in Comparison, by Country 
Sources:  Freedom House: Freedom in the World 2009 (for 2008 scores for all countries except Zambia and Zimbabwe) and Freedom in the 
World 2010 (for 2009 scores for Zambia and Zimbabwe), available at www.freedom.org. 
Polity IV:  The Polity Score subtracts the Autocracy Score from the Democracy Score, available at www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm 












(0 to 4) 
Polity  Score  
Polity Score, 
2008 















(0 to 10) 
Botswana 2.83 3.21  8 5.0 8.45 8.40 
Ghana 2.57 3.18  8 5.5 8.10 8.15 
Malawi 2.48 2.34  6 3.0 6.60 6.40 
Tanzania 2.48 2.85 -1 3.5 6.85    6.15 ↓ 
Namibia 2.34 2.69  6 5.0 8.10 7.80 
Benin 2.30 2.78  7 5.0 7.90 7.70 
Mozambique 2.29 2.37  6 4.0 6.55 6.35 
Cape Verde 2.21 2.48 -- 6.0 -- -- 
Madagascar 2.21 1.91  7 3.5 7.45     6.00  ↓ 
Burkina Faso 2.21 2.32  0 3.0 6.30     5.77  ↓ 
Liberia 2.17 2.33  6 3.5 5.30     6.18  ↑ 
Mali 2.16 2.29  7 4.5 7.25 7.15 
South Africa 2.14 2.20  9 5.0 8.60     7.60  ↓ 
Lesotho 2.09 1.66  8 4.5 -- 5.70 
Zambia 2.03 1.98  7 3.5 6.80 6.65 
Senegal 1.95 1.83  8 4.0 7.10     6.30  ↓ 
Uganda 1.94 2.14 -1 2.5 6.80 6.85 
Kenya 1.90 1.89  7 3.5 7.00     5.85  ↓ 
Zimbabwe 1.69 1.41 -4 1.0 3.97 3.95 
Nigeria 1.66 1.58  4 2.5 6.05    4.80  ↓ 
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Table 6: Comparing Democracy Indicators  








Freedom House, 2008-2009 













Cells display bivariate Pearson‘s r correlation coefficients 
 
 
Figure 1: Afrobarometer Quality of Democracy Compared With Polity IV 
 
 
Popular evaluations of the Quality of Democracy correlate more strongly with 
the Freedom House scores, which combine measures of political rights and civil 
liberties as measured in the year of the survey (2008 or 2009) (r=.589, p=.006).  
A visual inspection of the resulting scatter plot indicates that Malawians and 
Tanzanians over-rate their country‘s quality of democracy compared to Freedom 
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House, while Cape Verdians and to a lesser extent Nigerians underrate theirs 
(see Figure 2). Citizen ratings of Democratic Quality also correlate at about the 
same level with the 2008 Bertelsmann scores (r=.588; p=.01)
18
 which aggregate 
18 indicators clustered into five different sets of variables covering the integrity 
of the state, freedom of political participation, the rule of law, the stability of 
democratic institutions and patterns of political and social integration 
(Bertelsmann Stiftung 2009: 16-17). We again see that Malawians and 
Tanzanians seem to overrate their quality of democracy compared to the expert 
judges at Bertelsmann, while South Africans and Nigerians are, again, more 
critical, as are Kenyans and Senegalese (see Figure 3).  It is interesting to note 
that the Index of Democratic Quality correlates much more strongly with the 
Bertelsmann scores for 2010 (r=.729, p=.000).  This affinity might suggest that 
democratic changes and developments that are reflected almost immediately in 
public opinion may take longer to show-up in expert indices due to the sheer 
inertia of these large data collection and coding enterprises.  In other words, the 
effects of either democratic gains or losses on expert indices may be lagged 
(Bertelsmann produce their estimates every two years). Thus, when the 
comparison shifts to Bertelsmann‘s 2010 scores, some of the most glaring gaps 
with Afrobarometer scores (generated in 2008-9) were reduced sharply because 
in 2010 Bertelsmann reduced its ratings in places like Nigeria, Kenya, Senegal 
and South Africa, and increased them for Liberia, bringing these countries‘ 
scores more closely in line with public evaluations from the previous year.  At 
the same time, the uncritical citizens of Tanzania, Malawi and Uganda still seem 
far more forgiving of the shortcomings in their political systems than the expert 




                                                          
18
 This correlation is calculated across 18 states for 2008 since Bertelsmann did not produce 
scores for either Cape Verde or Lesotho, and for 19 states in 2010 when Bertelsmann did not 
produce a score for Cape Verde. 
19
 While it might seem that Botswana sharply over-rate the quality of their democracy in 
relation to Freedom House and Bertelsmann judges, the regression line would probably come 
far closer to their position if Tanzanians and Malawians offered less optimistic ratings, and 
Nigerians more optimistic ratings. 
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Figure 4: Afrobarometer Quality of Democracy Compared With 
Bertelsmann Foundation, 2010 
 
 
So, while we detect broad convergence between estimates of democratic quality 
provided by citizens, on one hand, and political scientists on the other, there are 
also clear discrepancies. We thus return to the caveat we set out at the beginning 
of this paper.  How do we explain these differences between internal, subjective 
evaluations of quality and external expert assessments? Is one of the 
assessments more correct or valid?  And is it possible to locate an independent, 
Archimedean point from which to stand and judge citizen and expert 
evaluations?  While a systematic explanation of the gaps between mass and 
expert ratings is beyond the scope of the present paper, we offer several possible 
propositions which should be put to the test in future work.   
 
First of all, we recall the fact that Malawians and Tanzanians have been shown 
to be consistently far more favorable to their own political systems than the 
experts.  This suggests that citizens with low levels of formal education and who 
live in countries with weak information infrastructures (e.g. the number, reach 
of, and access to independent radio and television stations which carry political 
news, and the distribution and range of independent newspapers), and who are 
thus dependent on state news media for information might be expected to be 
more forgiving and less critical of democratic performance.  A second, quite 
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different possibility is that citizens of countries with different histories and 
experiences have diverse understandings of democracy, and thus may have 
varying expectations and standards against which they measure the quality of 
their own political systems (Bratton 2010).  Citizens who have fought liberation 
struggles in South Africa and Zimbabwe, or experienced electoral alternations in 
Benin and Ghana, may now have much higher expectations of their political 
leadership than citizens of Malawi and Tanzania, who are less experienced both 
with political struggle, and with the potential for democratic change .  Third, it is 
also possible that experts and citizens are exposed to sharply differing realities.  
How a political system looks from the ground up can be significantly different 
from how it looks from the top down.  When Freedom House or Bertelsmann 
ask experts to rate various features of these political systems, they are, for the 
most part, limited to a high level of aggregation and abstraction, drawing on 
factors such as existing laws or institutions and macro country-level data about 
how effectively those institutions are functioning.  In contrast, citizens evaluate 
their system from a much different vantage point.  They may know less about – 
and perhaps be less concerned with – what is happening among political elites at 
the central level, and instead respond more in terms of how democratic – or not 
– their own daily experience is.  Finally, it is worthwhile to ask whether external 
assessments are influenced by a country‘s reputation and history.  Does South 
Africa, a darling of the international community since the end of the apartheid 
era, receive overly high marks from indulgent experts?  Or is Tanzania‘s de 
facto one-party state not given enough credit for its political successes in 
creating a widespread sense of security, well-being and equality despite hardship 
among its population?   
 
However, we should not let discrepancies between mass and expert-based 
ratings of the quality of democracy obscure the fact that we have found 
considerable convergence between the two types of data.  Thus, the key message 
from this analysis is that until we gain better knowledge about the discrepancies, 
we should– whenever possible – use both mass and expert rating systems to 





Ordinary Africans are not only able to offer meaningful global assessments of 
the Supply of Democracy, they are also able to make distinct evaluations across 
discrete dimensions of Democratic Quality. Moreover, the component 
dimensions of African public opinion largely match up quite well with the 
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intellectual framework develop by Diamond and Morlino (2005).  While there is 
certainly room both for improving survey indicators, as well as for refining 
certain aspects of the Quality of Democracy framework itself to make it more 
amenable to producing effective measurement, our analysis has clearly 
demonstrated the value of both the framework, and of using public attitude data 
to operationalize that framework. 
 
Substantively, the subjective mass opinion perspective on the Quality of 
Democracy gives us insight into what Africans themselves want out of 
democracy, and how they prioritize its various components.  In general, African 
governments seem to be more interested in supplying – and African citizens 
seem to be more interested in getting – protection for rights and equality, as well 
as a strengthened institutional framework (horizontal accountability, election 
regulation).  Governments remain deficient in democratizing their interactions 
with citizens by creating mechanisms of vertical accountability and 
responsiveness, and citizens, quite frankly, seem considerably less interested in 
these goals as well. There is, however, significant cross-country variation in 
preferences and priorities, as well as evaluations. 
 
We also find that quality of democracy data can add a richness to our 
understanding of particular country contexts. It allows for finer distinctions 
between the democratic experiences of countries that may score similarly at 
higher levels of abstraction and aggregation.  Finally, the effects of approaching 
an assessment of democracy from the perspective of the multi-faceted quality of 
democracy framework, combined with utilizing public opinion data to generate 
indicators, leads to the conclusion that both individual and expert assessments 
deserve to be carefully interrogated. What parts of Africans‘ everyday 
experience of democracy (or lack thereof) are missed by country expert 
assessments? And what parts of democratic qualities (or flaws) are missed by 
citizens with limited access to independent sources of information about events 
and trends that lie beyond their immediate experience?  We cannot at this point 
conclude that either experts or ordinary citizens provide the ―true‖ or ―correct‖ 
assessment, but rather that both perspectives are essential to fully understanding 
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